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 3 
APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TO NON-INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS 
 
 
"What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be 
inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife" 
   Appeals Chamber on jurisdiction Tadić Case, paragraph 119 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of mankind conflicts and wars have been a part of life. In the 20th 
century, however, after the experiences of two world wars and the holocaust against the 
Jewish people, the United Nations organization was established with the main objective 
to prevent war and disseminate respect for human rights. Due to the sovereignty of states 
and the character of the United Nations as a political, inter-state organization, it can 
intervene in internal state affairs only as a last resort. This is most poignant if an internal 
conflict gets out of hand as happened in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone or Somalia. 
Conflicts of an ethnic origin are most complex and placing armies between the belligerent 
parties cannot be but a temporary solution. The solution lies in times of peace, when 
deeply rooted convictions should be dug up and exposed to broad daylight where they 
may evaporate and "they" appear to be "us". The applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to non-international conflicts will not prevent ethnic confrontations, nor will it influence 
hatred or indifference. It may be just a drop in the ocean, but then at least that drop is 
there.  
In this thesis I will research the possibility of the application of the Geneva Conventions to 
non-international conflicts, as they may give a better protection to civilians in an ethnic 
civil war. To obtain an idea of the structure of applicability of the Geneva Conventions I 
will describe them in the first chapter and in the second chapter I will look at their position 
in international law and compare them with human rights law as there seems to be a 
connection between the two bodies of law. In the third chapter the possibilities of direct 
effect will be explored as well as the applicability of the notion of jus cogens to 
humanitarian law. As it is often suggested that today the sovereignty of states is eroding 
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to the benefit of international organizations, I will discuss sovereignty in the fourth 
chapter. The fifth chapter contains the discussion on the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia 
tribunal in the Tadić case and a comparison of the outcome with the ICC Statute. I will 
conclude in the sixth chapter. 
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2 Geneva Conventions
 
2.1 History 
On 24 June 1859, after 15 hours of bitter fighting, the battle of Solferino between the 
French-Sardinian army and the Austrians, was over. The ground was covered with the 
bodies of 40.000 dead and wounded men. At the time of the battle, Henry Dunant, a 
Swiss citizen on business, visited the nearby village of Castiglione delta Pieve when 
casualties filled up the town. He was horrified by the sight of thousands of wounded, lying 
there while the army medical services proved to be inadequate to care for them and the 
corpses were not being retrieved. There was a lack of medical care, water and food for 
those who fought bravely for their country and paid dearly for the privilege. Only 140 
doctors were available and they had no choice but to perform life threatening surgery 
under dreadful circumstances. There was a lack of anaesthetics, medicine, bandages 
and shelter. Wounds infected causing men to die who could have lived given proper care. 
Knapsacks and food were stolen from the wounded and boots from the dead. However, 
there were also soldiers and civilians helping the enemies' wounded, giving them water 
and staying with them in their last minutes. 
On his return home Dunant wrote a book about his experiences, "A Memory of Solferino", 
in which he gives a truthful description of the battle. 
 
 "When the sun came up on the twenty-fifth, it disclosed the most dreadful sights 
imaginable. Bodies of men and horses covered the battlefield; corpses were 
strewn over roads, ditches, ravines, thickets and fields; the approaches of 
Solferino were literally thick with dead. The fields were devastated, wheat and 
corn lying flat on the ground, fences broken, orchards ruined; here and there 
were pools of blood. The villages were deserted and bore the scars left by 
musket shots, bombs, rockets, grenades and shells. Walls were broken down 
and pierced with gaps where cannonballs had crushed through them. Houses 
were riddled with holes, shattered and ruined, and their inhabitants, who had 
been in hiding, crouching in cellars without light or food for nearly twenty hours, 
were beginning to crawl out, looking stunned by the terrors they had endured. All 
around Solferino, and especially in the village cemetery, the ground was littered 
with guns, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, mess tins, helmets, shakoes, fatigue-
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caps, belts, equipment of every kind, remnants of blood-stained clothing and 
piles of broken weapons."1 
 
Dunant was not just a businessman. He was brought up with religious convictions and 
high moral principles. From an early age on he engaged in several charitable and religion 
based organizations and was a regular visitor to the city prison, where he labored to help 
reform transgressors of the law.2 No wonder that he took the events in Solferino to heart 
and was determined to do something to improve the fate of soldiers in the battlefield. In 
his book he not only described the battle but he also showed a realistic view of the future: 
 
 "Since new and terrible methods of destruction are invented daily, with 
perseverance worthy of a better object, and since the inventors of these 
instruments of destruction are applauded and encouraged in most of the great 
European States, which are engaged in an armament race; 
… 
And since finally the state of mind in Europe combines with many other 
symptoms to indicate the prospect of future wars, the avoidance of which, sooner 
or later, seems hardly possible;" 
 
and  proposed: 
 
 "Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for 
the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted 
and thoroughly qualified volunteers?"3
 
And these volunteers, organised in national societies, would be called upon to assist the 
army medical services and were to be recognized and protected through an international 
agreement. The neutrality of the organization was and still is a crucial point for the 
protection of the volunteers. Henry Dunant was realistic as to the fact that peace, in the 
narrow sense of life without war, was not feasible and therefore chose the next best, that 
is, if there has to be war, let it be as little damaging for people as possible with care for 
                                             
1  Dunant 1862. 
2  ICRC website. 
3  Dunant 1862. 
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the wounded regardless their nationality. He recognized the damaging effect of modern 
weapons and foresaw more wars in the future and therefore called upon states to prevent 
or at least limit the destruction that these weapons and wars would cause. His focus was 
on human beings and humane treatment. He did not have a political message. In fact the 
more his idea was realised, the more he retreated. He was a realist with a vision, but not 
one to stand in the lime-light. 
In 1863 a private committee was set up by the Geneva Society for Public Welfare, a 
charitable association, to consider how Dunant's ideas might be realised. The committee 
consisted of General Dufour, Gustave Moynier, physiciens Théodore Maunoir and Louis 
Appia, and Henry Dunant himself and it organized a conference in Geneva, to which 
sixteen countries and four philanthropic institutions sent their representatives. The 
conference recommended the creation of national societies, with the protection and 
support of their governments. Furthermore the conference proposed that in time of war 
lazarets and field hospitals be declared neutral, as well as medical staff, volunteers and 
the wounded themselves. 
In 1864 the Swiss Federal Council convened a Diplomatic Conference in Geneva with 
plenipotentiaries of 12 countries taking part. The conference drew up the "Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field", 
which later became Convention I, and was signed on 22 August of that year and ratified 
by almost all the States in the years that followed. The recommendations of the 
committee of five were formalized in the convention and it contained the basic principle 
that wounded and sick soldiers must be taken in and cared for without distinction of 
nationality. 
From then on the organization gradually developed into what is now known as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross4 with national societies in almost every country 
of the world. The national Red Cross societies are grouped in a world federation, the 
League of Red Cross Societies. In 1928 the ICRC and the League joined in an umbrella 
organization, the International Red Cross, with the ICRC as the promoter and custodian 
of international humanitarian law. As the focus of the organization developed over time 
the original 1864 Convention was adapted and supplemented.  
In 1899 the first International Peace Conference was held at The Hague and a new 
convention "for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 
                                             
4  Hereinafter: ICRC. 
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Convention of 22 August 1864" was signed by the representatives of the States. The 
second Peace Conference, also held in The Hague in  1907 adopted the "regulations 
concerning the laws and customs of war on land" which prohibit means of waging war 
which cause cruel and unnecessary suffering and stipulate humane treatment of 
prisoners of war and the observance of certain fundamental rights of inhabitants of 
occupied territories. These conventions are known as "Hague law" and primarily seek to 
lay down the conduct of military operations. They restrict the freedom of belligerent states 
to attack specified persons and objectives and ban the use of certain methods and 
means of combat in the conduct of war. 
The 1864 Geneva Convention was revised in 1906, when the relief societies were added,  
and in 1929 when the "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War" was adopted, which added in greater detail the rules contained in The Hague law 
on war on land, taking into account the experience of World War I. 
In 1949 an extensive revision of the Law of Geneva already in force was undertaken and 
a new legal instrument, the "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War" was added. This Convention again relates to the regulations of 
The Hague law on war on land, but it also takes into account the experience of World 
War II. Whereas The Hague law and the Geneva Conventions both seek to protect 
human beings, humanitarian concerns are more pronounced in the Geneva Conventions, 
which deal directly with problems relating to persons affected by war and The Hague law 
concerns the obligations during and limitations of warfare. The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions were supplemented in 1977 by two Additional Protocols, adopted by the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which had been meeting in Geneva 
since 1974 on invitation by the Swiss Federal Council. Protocol I deals with international 
armed conflicts, and Protocol II with non-international armed conflicts. There now exists a 
substantial body of universally recognized rules known as the Geneva Conventions and 
their two Protocols,5 also known as international humanitarian law,6 for the protection of 
those who do not/no longer take part in the hostilities. 
                                             
5  A third Additional Protocol entered into force on 8 December 2005. It introduces a fourth distinctive 
emblem, next to the red cross, the red crescent and the red lion and sun, a red frame in the shape of a 
square on edge on a white ground, the purpose of which is to prevent the possibility of offence taken by 
some countries of the existing emblems leading to a possible threat for those protected by the emblems. 
6  In fact humanitarian law consists, besides the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols, of refugee law, 
the UN Genocide Convention and the conventions prohibiting chemical and biological weapons. I would 
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In the next paragraph I will describe the structure of the application of the Geneva 
Conventions. I will first look at what armed conflict is according to the Conventions and 
then specify this term to international and non-international armed conflict. 
 
2.2 Armed conflict 
In the Geneva Conventions the term "armed conflict" is used instead of the term "war". 
These Conventions, or any other convention that codifies armed conflict,7 do not provide 
a definition of the term. I will therefore try and deduce from the texts of the Geneva 
Conventions which conflicts the term "armed conflict" might embrace. According to the 
Dutch dictionary Van Dale "war" means:" a conflict between two or more peoples, kings 
or states". This is a broad definition and it could also apply to a civil war. As the Geneva 
Conventions are traditional conventions, respecting state sovereignty, any reference to 
civil strive or civil war may have been intentionally excluded by the states and the neutral 
term "armed conflict" may have been chosen instead. From the Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols we learn: 
● Common article 2, in describing the field of application of the Geneva 
Conventions, speaks of "… all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them", therefore using the 
terms "war" and "armed conflict" in the specific (traditional) meaning as a conflict 
between two or more states, either or not declared.  
● Protocol I, article 1 paragraph 4 adds to common article 2 those armed conflicts 
in which: " … peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination," 
● Common article 3, when stating "… the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, …", does not specify 
the parties to the conflict and therefore this definition of an internal armed conflict 
                                                                                                                       
also include the first Optional Protocol to the Convention on Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflicts. 
7  For example The Hague Conventions on warfare. 
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is in fact quite broad, it can be any internal armed conflict, provided the term 
"Party" does not equal the term "High Contracting Party".8
● Protocol II, article 1 paragraph 1 declares to apply to "all armed conflicts" not 
covered by article 1 of Protocol I, but then limits them by adding: " … which take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol". 
● Protocol II, article 1 paragraph 2 describes armed conflict negatively: " … 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature," are not armed 
conflicts.  
Therefore armed conflict, as far as can be deduced from the texts of the Geneva 
Conventions and the two Additional Protocols, means: 
● an armed conflict between two or more states, either or not declared as war; 
● colonial liberation and alien occupation conflicts and conflicts against racists 
regimes, therefore the so-called "liberation fights"; 
● any armed conflict in the territory of a Party;  
● an armed conflict in the territory of a Party between its armed forces and other 
forces, provided the latter have quite a high quality of organization, with the 
exclusion of internal disturbances. 
I conclude that the term "armed conflict" as used in the Geneva Conventions is broader 
than the term "war" as used commonly. As said above, the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols are traditional conventions, respecting state sovereignty and as 
such they distinguish between international and non-international conflicts, as the latter 
are considered internal affairs of a state. Therefore not all of the regulations of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols apply to all four of the mentioned 
armed conflicts. However, according to David,9 the rules that apply to the "smaller" 
conflict also apply to the "larger" conflict, therefore, common article 3 and Protocol II 
apply to internal conflicts as well as to international ones. I wil now take a closer look at 
the distinction.  
                                             
8  According to  this Greenwood this not the case. Greenwood 2004, p. 48, sub 2. 
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2.3 International armed conflict 
Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply to 
international armed conflict, either or not declared as war. This is the traditional interstate 
military conflict, no matter the intensity of the fight, the number of casualties or prisoners. 
The field of application is quite liberal as long as it concerns an interstate conflict. 
Additional Protocol I supplements the armed conflicts of the Geneva Conventions for the 
protection of war victims and covers the abovementioned freedom fights. Common article 
2, subparagraph 2 adds to these armed conflicts: " The Convention shall also apply to all 
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting party, even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance". The reason I did not mention this 
situation in the preceding paragraph is, that there is no reference to the term "armed 
conflict". The situation of occupation is – apparently – not considered to be an armed 
conflict, even if there is armed resistance. Furthermore, subparagraph 2 of common 
article 2 is written in neutral terms, whereas article 1, paragraph 4 of Additional Protocol I 
not only refers to armed conflict, it is also written from the point of view of the defending 
people. In common article 2, subparagraph 2 the parties negotiating the Geneva 
Conventions chose not to make the distinction between an occupation that met with 
armed resistance and could therefore be considered an armed conflict, and an 
occupation that did not meet with armed resistance. The occupation of common article 2, 
subparagraph 2, I would say, is broader than the one of article 1, paragraph 4 of 
Additional Protocol I. The latter referring to armed conflict of peoples against alien 
occupation in the exercise of their right to self-determination. It may therefore be 
interesting to look at the occupation as described in common article 2, subparagraph 2, 
especially whether only the traditional interstate (military) occupation is meant or whether 
it is possible for people of a state to occupy their own state's territory. As this is closer to 
non-international conflict I will look into it in the next paragraph. 
 
2.4 Non-international armed conflict 
In case of a non-international conflict there are two regulations within the Geneva 
Conventions that apply: Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol II. However, as to the applicability of these two regulations a distinction in non-
                                                                                                                       
9  David 2002, p. 116 and 117. 
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international armed conflicts must be made based on the level of intensity. Common 
article 3 applies to all non-international armed conflicts in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, without giving any further specifics. It could therefore apply to riots, 
as well as terrorist attacks. As seen above, according to article 1, paragraph 1 of 
Additional Protocol II, this protocol applies only to those armed conflicts in which the 
armed forces of the High Contracting Party and other, specifically described, organized 
armed groups take part. As to Additional Protocol II, the same applies here as described 
above regarding Additional Protocol I: it narrows a term used in the Geneva Conventions 
down. Not the Conventions themselves though, as in paragraph 1 of article 1 Additional 
Protocol II it states that this protocol "… develops and supplements Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions or 
application …". Therefore, the fact that " … situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, … " are not armed conflicts applies only to Additional Protocol II and strictly 
speaking would not limit the term "armed conflict" of common article 3. One could ponder, 
however, what the armed aspect of disturbances, tensions, riots etc. could be. There 
must be a certain intensity of use of arms for a disturbance to become an armed conflict. 
Therefore a literal explanation could lead to the conclusion that article 1, paragraph 1 
Additional Protocol II cannot limit common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, but in 
practice the difference is but small. There will only be a limited amount of situations in 
which an internal disturbance carries such amount of arms that it becomes an armed 
conflict. For those states which signed and ratified the International Criminal Court10 
Statute common article 3 is limited by article 8, paragraph 2, sub d of the ICC Statute in 
the same way Additional Protocol II does. According to David,11 G. Gidel for the 
Commission of Experts on the Non-International Armed Conflict of 1955 and R. Pinto for 
the same Commission of 1962, common article 3 indeed does not apply to internal 
disturbances and tensions. The terms "develop and supplement" of article 1, paragraph 1 
of Additional Protocol II apparently also mean "specify" as this protocol can narrow the 
term "armed conflict" of common article 3 down. According to the ICRC12 in the 
Commentaries to the Additional Protocols article 1 paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II 
distinguishes its situation from the one of common article 3 by intensity, the former being 
                                             
10  Hereinafter: ICC. 
11  David 2002, p. 123. 
12  David 2002, p. 128. 
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a full-scale civil strife,13 the latter anything between disturbances and civil strife. If the 
conditions of the protocol are met, common article 3 also applies, but in the reverse 
situation the protocol does not. As said above, common article 3 therefore has a wider 
application than article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II. For the application of 
common article 3 the minimum criteria for a non-international armed conflict are: a 
minimum of organization such that one can speak of "parties", being or controlling armed 
forces, and an open and collective display of hostilities. The duration of the conflict, the 
prisoners taken, the victims made and the nature and level of the violence distinguish the 
situation of common article 3 from internal disturbances and riots. If the situation 
becomes such that intervention of the governmental forces is necessary, this could 
trigger the application of Additional Protocol II, provided the conditions of article 1, 
paragraph 1 as to the organizational level of the opposing parties are met. 
David14 offers two interesting views as to the Statute of the ICC. The first one is, that, 
although the Statute only applies to the ICC, due to the number of signatories it holds the 
opinion of the larger part of states or at least the states which participated in the 
diplomatic conference for the negotiation and conclusion of the ICC Statute. One could, 
therefore, support the idea that the Statute represents the opinion iuris of 1998 as to non-
international armed conflict. David's second point of view is that the ICC Statute extends 
the scope of the non-international armed conflict in article 8, paragraph 2, sub f. At first 
the Statute follows article 1, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol II as to the limitation of an 
internal armed conflict by the exclusion of disturbances, riots, etc., but then extends the 
term "armed conflict" by adding "protracted armed conflict" [emphasis added] and 
extends article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II by adding the situation of an 
armed conflict between organized armed groups [emphasis added], thereby abandoning 
the condition that one of the parties to the conflict should be the governmental authorities, 
as well as the condition of the level of organization.15  
In article 8, paragraph 2 sub f, the ICC Statute follows the ICTY in the Tadić case. The 
extension of the scope of Additional Protocol II would, according to David, not only  be 
the point of view of an international tribunal, it is also the opinio iuris of the states 
participating in the diplomatic conference on the ICC Statute. As the ICC Statute is a lex 
posterior to the Geneva Conventions, article 8, paragraph 2, sub f would substitute the 
                                             
13  Also Greenwood 2004, p. 48, sub 2. 
14  David 2002, p. 116. 
15  As to article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions it only extends the term "armed conflict". 
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provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In my opinion, David, as to his view on the opinio 
iuris, has the idea of a constitutional state, more specifically the element of separation of 
powers, against him. Diplomats, negotiating a treaty, are the executive of a state, not the 
legislature. Signing the treaty is expressing the intention on the part of the state to ratify 
the treaty and be bound by it. Whether ratification will follow however is decided by the 
legislature and in a democratic state that will be the elected (houses of) parliament. 
Separation of powers, being an element of a constitutional state, plays an important part 
in the ratification of a treaty and therefore a treaty negotiated and, as an intention to be 
bound, signed in the name of the state, needs to be ratified by the legislature to take 
effect. If the signing of the treaty by diplomats would express the opinio iuris of states, 
they can not be bound by it as a constitutive element of being bound has not taken place 
yet. Only those states which signed and ratified the ICC Statute are bound by it and for 
those states the scope of application of Additional Protocol II is extended according to 
article 8, paragraph 2, sub f of the ICC Statute. The latter being a lex posterior to the 
former. For those states which signed the ICC Statute, but did not ratify it, I would say, 
their legislature, by not agreeing to ratification, explicitly denied the intention to be bound 
by the treaty and with that implicitly denied to having the opinio iuris. On the other hand, 
David's opinion that signing a treaty is a proof of an opinio iuris of a state could imply that 
David adheres to the idea of a division of sovereignty in an external and an internal 
sovereignty and that the former, separately, represents the opinion of the state. I will 
return to this later in the chapter of sovereignty, but in my view such division of 
sovereignty would undermine the element of separation of powers, which is a system of 
checks and balances within a state. As we will see in the chapter on direct effect, 
according to Ferdinandusse's research national courts do limit a state's freedom to 
disregard signed, unratified treaties on humanitarian law, but in just as many cases they 
do not, based on the fact that a state cannot be bound if the treaty is not ratified. As said, 
how then can a –  only – signed treaty express the opinio iuris of the state or states? The 
answer could be that although a state cannot be bound by the opinio iuris it has, the state 
still is of the opinion that the contents of the signed treaty express norms as they should 
be. Which explanation concurs with the "intention to be bound". One can ponder what the 
value of the opinio iuris , as one can never connect any consequences to a state's opinio 
iuris.16 Let alone, consider states which did not sign the ICC Statute to be bound by an 
                                             
16  This is different in case a treaty has direct effect, as we will see in chapter 4. 
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extension of the term "non-international armed conflict" based on the fact that the 
majority of states has an opinio iuris. The opinio iuris becomes interesting when it is 
connected with state practice, as it may then lead to the conclusion that a rule of 
customary law exists.  
A different subject arises from article 2, subparagraph 2 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions considering occupation. Imagine the situation that the "citizens"17 of a state 
occupy it in such a way that the state effectively looses control over (part of) its territory. If 
we consider the purpose of occupation to be obtaining the land, with or without the 
people that live on it, occupation will in general be seen as an interstate action. The 
question now is whether a ethnic cleansing conflict could be seen as an attempt to 
occupy the land for oneself? The purpose of ethnic cleansing is to kill all people of a 
certain race and the spin-off is that one has the land to himself. The purpose, therefore, is 
not to occupy the land. Occupation of the land by citizens with the purpose to obtain it for 
themselves, would be more in line with a liberation fight, in which case Additional 
Protocol I applies, if signed and ratified. David18 refers to a similar situation when 
discussing the application of Additional Protocol II to conflicts between two or more 
armed groups, not being state forces. If, in his view, a state would loose control and one 
of the parties to the conflict claims to be the High Contracting Party, it would be contrary 
to the principle of non-intervention to deny this party that right and Additional Protocol II 
would apply, under the condition that the state did loose control and the party claiming to 
be the High Contracting Party satisfies the conditions of article 1, paragraph 1 of 
Additional Protocol II as to their level of organization. Mutatis mutandis this could apply to 
the occupation under subparagraph 2, common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. The 
idea comes in three steps. First, if the occupation meets with armed resistance, the idea 
of civilian occupation resembles the situation of the "freedom fights" of Additional 
Protocol I. Second, the occupation does not meet with armed resistance and a situation 
can occur like Tibet, being colonized by the Chinese, or Western Sahara, colonized by 
the Moroccans, the Palestinian Territories, colonized and walled by the Israeli. The longer 
the occupation last, the more it becomes internal. If (official) resistance against the 
occupation continues and on a large enough scale, the occupying state cannot claim the 
land as there is no acquiescence of the occupied state with the situation and the Geneva 
Conventions would continue to apply. Third, people want to liberate themselves from an 
                                             
17  In whatever form. 
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unwanted regime and claim the land for themselves. We have to think of strikes, 
demonstrations, sit-ins, public prayers, all on a very large scale, continuously, at several 
places in the state, simultaneously. If this occurs on such a scale that it disrupts the 
economy and the intimidating or forceful (re)actions of the government no longer have 
any effect, it has no other option but to step down. The parallel with David's situation lies 
in a party claiming to be the government, which cannot be denied. It would not trigger the 
application of the Geneva Conventions as there is no foreign element to the occupation. 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II do not apply 
either, as it is not an armed conflict. 
The system of non-international armed conflict is as follows, in decreasing intensity: 
● article 1, paragraph 1 Additional Protocol II; 
● article 8, paragraph 2, sub f (for those states that signed and ratified the ICC 
Statute); 
● common article 3 Geneva Conventions (for those states that did not sign and 
ratify the ICC Statute); 
● depending on the interpretation of article 1, paragraph 1 Additional Protocol II, 
theoretically, another level of intensity could be inserted here. There may not be 
much practical use of this level as the transition from one level to another will be 
fluent. 
● internal disturbances and tensions. 
David considered the possibility of an extra category, but decided against it as he 
assumes the situation of article 8, paragraph 2 sub f ICC Statute to apply to all states 
party to the Geneva Conventions, derived from an opinio iuris based on the number of 
signatories to the ICC Statute. 
 
2.5 Conclusion
The purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to protect those who do not or no longer 
participate in hostilities, to treat adversaries humanely and respect human dignity in 
general during times of conflict. The Conventions are traditional international treaties, 
respecting the sovereignty of states. For the application of the Geneva Conventions a 
distinction must be made between international armed conflict and non-international 
conflict. According to article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions the former applies to 
                                                                                                                       
18  David 2002, p. 120. 
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armed conflict between two or more States Party to the Conventions, in which case the 
scope of application of the Conventions is quite liberal. Protocol I adds the so-called 
freedom fights and the protection of war victims to the general application of article 2 
common to the Geneva Conventions. In case of non-international armed conflict, 
depending on the level of intensity, Additional Protocol II or article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions applies, the latter being the general article. For those states that 
signed and ratified the ICC Statute article 8, paragraph 2, sub f creates a level of intensity 
between the two mentioned levels as it contains "protracted armed conflict" and "between 
organized armed groups". A forth and lowest level of intensity is formed by the internal 
disturbances and riots as these cannot be called "armed" conflicts. In theory, dependant 
on the interpretation of article 1, paragraph 1 Additional Protocol II, a level of intensity 
could be considered between the third and the forth level, but as the transition from one 
level to another will be fluent, in practice this level will hardly be noticeable. 
Within the system of article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions I looked at the 
possibility of occupation by a state's own civilians, but as there is no foreign element in 
this kind of occupation the Geneva Conventions would not apply, nor would article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol II as peaceful resistance is 
not an armed conflict. 
I will now look at the position of the Geneva Conventions in international law and more 
specifically at the relationship between the Geneva Conventions and human rights law, 
as both these bodies of law protect human dignity. 
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3 Position of Geneva Conventions in international law  
 
3.1 General
Traditionally a strict separation existed between the law of peace and the law of war. 
States were in a state of either one, there was no middle ground. In general it was 
thought that war had to be declared by a state in order to take effect. The idea of a rigid 
distinction between the law of war and the law of peace has been abandoned today. 
Since 1945 states rarely regard themselves to be in a formal state of war. During a 
conflict diplomatic relations are not necessarily severed and non-hostile relations as trade 
may continue. Treaty relations between states engaged in armed conflict or even 
proclaimed war may continue as in peacetime and the more these non-hostile relations 
continue, the more important the law of peace will be. A distinction should be made here 
as to private law and public law. Whereas the continuance of the former will be the 
prerogative of the states, the continuance of the latter is not. Conventions on international 
criminal law, human rights law, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, provided states are 
party to them, can only be derogated from if and as far as the conventions allow. 
Principles of international law and peremptory norms will continue to apply during armed 
conflict. In this chapter I would like to focus on human rights law, because (i) it continues 
to apply during armed conflict and (ii) it is national law and an overlap between human 
rights law and the Geneva Conventions may be in support of the idea of applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts. I will first look at the evolution of 
both bodies of law to obtain a better view as to their position towards each other and then 
zoom in on the overlap between them.  
 
3.2 Evolution of the Geneva Conventions and international human rights law 
Although the similarity of their aims gives the impression that they are closely related, as 
both bodies of law protect basic human rights, international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, were not intended to be related from the outset. According 
to Kolb19 there are two kinds of reasons for the almost total independence of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. The first reason relates to the 
genesis and development of both bodies of law. The law of war originates from Antiquity, 
not only in Persia, Greece and Rome, but also in India, the Islamic Region, Ancient China 
                                             
19  Kolb 1998. 
 
 19 
and in Africa ideas about warfare were known. These ideas developed further when 
European states emerged and fought their wars. The uniform character of these ideas led 
to the creation of customary rules of law, which were mainly viewed as inter-state law, 
consolidated and greatly influenced by the views of writers like Grotius20 and 
Rousseau.21 As seen above, when discussing the history of the Geneva Conventions, 
only in the 19th century, when new and destructive weapons were used, a law based on 
mutual conventions was developed. 
The idea of human rights, however, is of a much younger date. It originates from the Age 
of Enlightenment, the idea of natural law, and is expressed in domestic constitutional law, 
as it considers the relationship between states and their citizens. For example the 1628 
Petition of Rights, 1679 Habeas Corpus Act and the 1689 Bill of Rights of England, the 
1776 Virginia Bill of Rights of America and the 1789 Déclaration de droit de l'homme et 
du citoyen of France. Only after the Second World War, as a result of the atrocities of this 
war, human rights developed within international law. It was then that international human 
rights law was placed alongside the law of war, but it was a new and young body of law 
and hardly considered an interesting object of analysis. 
The second kind of reasons, according to Kolb, are more connected with the respective 
organizations that developed the two branches of law. From the outset, the United 
Nations refused to include any discussion on the law of war as it was not considered to fit 
within the object and purpose of the organization, which was to promote international 
peace and security, therefore a jus contra bellum. The ICRC, on her part, thought it 
essential to stay neutral as a protection of her volunteers and therefore independent of 
the United Nations, which is a political organization of states. The two branches, human 
rights law and the law of war, developed separately as can be seen both from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which does not mention human rights in 
times of conflict and the absence of a reference to human rights in the drafts of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The ICRC's more practical and realistic view stems from 
Dunant, who, as said above, realised in 1862 that war would be hard to vanquish and 
therefore focused on limiting the consequences of it. The focus on peace of the United 
Nations results from, as the preamble of the Charter states, the experience of two world 
wars in one lifetime. Although both organizations are established as a result of the 
atrocities of war, their focus is quite opposite, one on (limiting the effects of) war, the 
                                             
20  De iure belli ac pacis. 
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ICRC, and the other, the United Nations, on peace. The same applies to their method, 
one, the ICRC, practical, and the other, the United Nations, political. Their respective 
bodies of law's point of convergence is, that both protect the dignity of individual human 
beings. But in this convergence there is again a divergence as human rights treaties 
attribute (supreme) subjective rights to individuals for states to implement in their 
domestic law, and are therefore mainly seen as a domestic issue, whereas humanitarian 
law is based on the objective concept of the protected person defined according to his 
status in relation to the events of mainly international war, adding an element of 
reciprocity. I will now take a look at a possible overlap between the Geneva Conventions 
and human rights law and if the consequences for the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions in non-international conflicts. 
 
3.3 Overlap between Geneva Conventions and human rights law  
Although the Geneva Conventions apply in times of armed conflict this does not exclude 
the applicability of the law of peace.22 Nevertheless, derogation from provisions or 
treaties during times of war is possible. This can be done either by invoking articles 61 
(impossibility of performance) and 62 (fundamental change of circumstances) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or by invoking provisions on derogation in the 
treaties themselves, as for example article 4 ICCPR,23 article 15 ECHR24 and article 27 
IACHR.25 In case of the ICCPR derogation is possible when two conditions are met (i) an 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and (ii) official proclamation by the state 
of the emergency. Both the ECHR and the IACHR have similar provisions. The extent of 
derogation from the provisions of the ICCPR is limited by (i) the exigencies of the 
situation, (ii) other obligations under international law, (iii) prohibition of discrimination. 
The first limitation reflects the principle of proportionality and regards duration, 
geographical coverage and material scope of the emergency. As to the second limitation, 
according to the Human Rights Committee in General Comment no. 29,26 article 4 cannot 
be read as a justification for derogation from the Covenant if this would entail a breach 
from a state's other international obligations, whether based on a treaty or general 
                                                                                                                       
21  Du contrat sociale. 
22  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 240, § 25. 
23  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 
24  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
25 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 
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international law, particularly the rules of international humanitarian law. The third 
limitation regards the prohibition of discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, 
language, religion or social origin.  
Article 4 paragraph 1 ICCPR, therefore, creates the possibility of unilateral, temporal 
derogation from (some) human rights provisions in time of war. It does not state this 
derogation as rule, on the contrary, it is the exception to the rule. The rule being that 
human rights apply during time of emergency threatening the life of the nation. Article 4 
also makes an exception to the exception in paragraph 2: the non-derogable rights of 
articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading 
punishment, or of medical or scientific experimentation without consent), 8, paragraph 1 
and 2 (prohibition of slavery, slave-trade and servitude), 11 (prohibition of detention for 
non-compliance contract), 15 (nullem crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lega poenali), 16 
(recognition of everyone as a person before the law) and 18 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion).  
According to the Human Rights Committee this enumeration of non-derogable rights is 
related to, but not identical with, the question whether some human rights obligations 
bear the nature of peremptory norms of international law27 and the Committee sees this 
enumeration partly as a recognition of the peremptory nature of some of the mentioned 
rights e.g. articles 6 and 7. On the one hand, some of the provisions are mentioned as 
non-derogable as it can never be necessary to derogate from them, e.g. articles 11 and 
18. On the other, the category of non-derogable norms extends beyond the mentioned 
list in article 4, paragraph 2 ICCPR and states cannot invoke article 4 as a justification to 
violate humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, "for instance by taking 
hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or 
by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trail, including the presumption of 
innocence."28
The Committee then continues that in assessing the scope of legitimate derogation from 
the ICCPR she finds a criterion in the definition of crimes against humanity as codified in 
articles 5 and 7 of the ICC Statute. The argument is: "If action conducted under the 
authority of a State constitutes a basis for individual criminal responsibility for a crime 
                                                                                                                       
26  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001, replacing General Comment no. 5 at the thirteenth session 
(1981). 
27  Para 11 of General Comment no. 29. 
28  Para 11 of General Comment no. 29. 
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against humanity by the persons involved in that action, article 4 of the Covenant cannot 
be used as justification that a state of emergency exempted the State in question from its 
responsibility in relation to the same conduct." The Committee is quite right, it cannot be 
that a person, acting under the authority of a state, is responsible where the state is not. 
The Committee lists "elements" of provisions not mentioned as non-derogable in article 4 
paragraph 2, which in the Committee's opinion cannot be subject to derogation: 
a) All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, as prescribed in article 10 
ICCPR is, according to the Committee, a norm of general international law not 
subject to derogation. This is supported by reference to human dignity in the 
preamble of the ICCPR and by close relations of articles 7 and 10. 
b) The prohibition against the taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged 
detention (article 9 ICCPR) are norms of general international law and as such 
not subject to derogation. 
c) International protection of persons belonging to minorities includes elements that 
must be respected in all circumstances. According to the Committee this is 
reflected in the prohibition against genocide, in the inclusion of a non-
discrimination clause in article 4 paragraph 1 ICCPR as well as in the non-
derogable nature of article 18. 
d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population without grounds is a crime against 
humanity according to article 7d of the ICC Statute. According to the Committee 
the legitimate right to derogate from article 12 of the ICCPR during a state of 
emergency can never be accepted as justifying such measures. 
e) No state of emergency may be invoked to justify propaganda for war, or 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence as prohibited by article 20 ICCPR. 
Although not based on the definition of crimes against humanity the Committee finds the 
following provisions also non-derogable: 
f) Article 2, paragraph 3 ICCPR, the state must provide an effective remedy in case 
of lawful derogation from any provision of the ICCPR, based on the fact that it 
constitutes a treaty obligation inherent in the covenant as a whole.  
g) As it is inherent in the protection of non-derogable rights mentioned in article 4 
ICCPR that they must be secured by procedural, often judicial guarantees, those 
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provisions of the ICCPR that provide procedural safeguards may never be 
derogated from. 
h) The Committee is of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law 
as laid down in article 4 as safeguards to derogation demand that fundamental 
requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency. 
Especially as international humanitarian law explicitly guarantees certain 
elements of fair trail during armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification for 
derogation from these guarantees during other emergency situations. 
Finally, article 6 of Protocol II to ICCPR prohibits derogation from article 1, paragraph 1 of 
this protocol based on article 4 of the ICCPR. In article 1, paragraph 1 Protocol II to 
ICCPR execution is prohibited, unless a reservation according to article 2 of the Protocol 
is made at the time of ratification or accession "that provides for the application of the 
death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction of a most serious crime of a military 
nature committed during wartime".  
The non-derogable rights of article 4 paragraph 2 ICCPR are often referred to as the hard 
core of human rights, but according to the Human Rights Committee in General 
Comment 29, as discussed above, many more rights are considered non-derogable in 
time of war.  
What does this mean as to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in non-
international armed conflicts? To extent the applicability of the Geneva Conventions  
to internal armed conflicts two ways can be followed, either direct application of the 
Geneva Conventions to national law, which I will address in the next chapter, or extent 
national law, human rights law, such that there is more overlap with the Geneva 
Conventions. The overlap lies in the non-derogable rights during time of war. As non-
derogable human rights are implemented and thus part of the national legal order, they 
apply during non-international armed conflicts. One could say that the Geneva 
Conventions are pulled into the national legal order by extension of the non-derogability 
of human rights. 
The comment I have to the above is comparable with the one I had on David's idea on 
opinio iuris. The criterion the Human Rights Committee uses is based on the ICC Statute, 
a treaty signed and ratified by about half of the states party to the ICCPR. For those 
states that signed and ratified both treaties the reasoning of the Committee is correct, but 
for those states that did not the scope of non-derogable rights of the ICCPR is extended 
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by way of a treaty, the ICC Statute, that they did not sign and/or ratify and to which they 
cannot be not bound. The ICCPR is a treaty a state, once party, cannot denounce or 
withdraw from. To extend the scope of the treaty without a state's consent, might weaken 
the effect of the treaty as states have no obligation to extend their national law 
accordingly. As we will see in the next chapter, national courts are not consistent in the 
application of international law to national law and often they consider national law to 
determine the applicability of international law. The effect of the abovementioned 
extension by the Human Rights Committee may therefore be minimal in national 
jurisdictions. 
The same applies to the Geneva Conventions, part of which is pulled into national law by 
the reasoning of the Human Rights Committee, although states cannot be bound if they 
did not sign and/or ratify the ICC Statute. If there is a way to apply the Geneva 
Conventions to non-international conflicts I believe it should be done within the system of 
both international and national law. 
As to the overlap between the Geneva Conventions and human rights law I agree with 
David: "…nous préférons laisser de côté les tableaux 'indéalistes' proposés par la 
doctrine et auxquels nous nous étions, nous-mêmes, raliés jadis, et synthétiser de la 
manière suivante ce qui nous semble être la réalité." According to David the overlap 
consists of the right to life and the right to physical integrity, which concurs with what the 
Human Rights Committee considers to be peremptory norms: the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture, article 6 and 7 ICCPR, although the latter is somewhat narrower 
than the right to physical integrity. Nieto-Navia29 considers these two basic human rights 
only within the Genocide Convention, articles 1 and 2, to be peremptory norms of 
international law, as only those two provisions satisfy the conditions of article 53 Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties.30 David's point of view on humanitarian law as jus 
cogens  I will discuss in the chapter on direct effect. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Because the idea of a strict separation between the law of peace and the law of war has 
been abandoned and since 1948 states do not consider themselves to be in a formal 
state of war, the law of peace has gained significance in times of armed conflict. This is 
especially the case for human rights law, as it is one of the bodies of law states cannot 
                                             
29  Nieto-Navia 2003. 
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denounce or freely derogate from. A comparison between the Geneva Conventions and 
human rights law resulted in an overlap as to the right to life and the right to physical 
integrity. This means that in times of armed conflict national law and inter-state law 
overlap in these two basic human rights. The question is what the effect of this overlap is 
on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in non-international conflicts. Or, to put it 
differently, is this overlap broad enough to support the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions to non-international conflicts? In my opinion it is not and to broaden the 
basis I will now turn to the question of direct effect to find out if this can add to support the 
idea of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in non-international conflicts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
30  Hereinafter: VCLT. 
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4 Direct effect 
 
4.1 General 
The question of direct effect of international law depends on the view one has of the 
relationship between national and international law. These views are since long divided 
between monism and dualism. In monistic thought international law and national law 
constitute one legal order and international law is part of and therefore valid in the 
national legal order. In dualistic thinking both bodies of law are separate legal orders. It 
is, however, not as easy as it seems, e.g. a problem that arises in the monistic system is 
the question of hierarchy and the evaluation of a monistic or dualistic system is often 
confused with political or ideological questions, a point that will return in the chapter on 
sovereignty. According to Ferdinandusse31 it is actually quite difficult to establish from 
state practice whether a monistic or dualistic view is applied, as rules of reference can 
often be explained either way. For example, if rules of reference are declarative this could 
evidence a monist attitude and in case of a constitutive rule it might be dualist. State 
practice may not even be consistent in its attitude towards the applicability of international 
law depending on its national law, not only as to rules of implementation but also as to 
the level of detail or the subject of the treaty. In his study, "Direct Application of 
International Criminal Law in National Courts", he "assumes that international law can, at 
least partly, regulate its own application in national courts." He does acknowledge, 
however, that in many states so many obstacles in national law are created as to the 
application of international law that the result is a de facto separation between 
international and national law. In order to obtain an idea of the possibilities of direct effect 
and therefore the limitations of the freedom of the state to implement international law as 
it wishes along either monistic or dualistic lines or both, I will discuss freedom of 
implementation of states. I will base this on the findings of Ferdinandusse's extensive 
study in his abovementioned book. First, however, I look at the subject of self-executing 
treaties, as this is a from of direct effect that is often limited by states based on their 
freedom of implementation. 
 
 
 
                                             
31  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 131. 
 
 27 
4.2 Self-executing treaties 
It is not possible to give a clear definition of a (non)self-executing provision, but 
Ferdinandusse deduces some general criteria, to be divided into objective and subjective 
criteria. As objective criteria, first, a treaty provision is non-self-executing when its subject 
is not amenable to adjudication in national courts. Second, when a treaty provision 
requires legislative action to take effect, either because the subject falls under the 
exclusive competence of the legislature, or the provision lacks precision, or it refers 
explicitly to legislation itself. The result of the objective criteria is that incomplete or 
imprecise treaty provisions are not to be applied by national courts. Whether or not treaty 
provisions are incomplete or imprecise is deduced from the content and language of the 
specific provision, although intent of the parties may be taken into account. The 
subjective criterion considers a treaty provision non-self-executing when parties did not 
intent the provision to be enforced in national courts. Here the content and language is 
subordinate to the parties' intent, which can be expressed by a clause in the treaty or a 
unilateral declaration at any point during the conclusion or implementation of the treaty. 
Although these criteria seem clear, Ferdinandusse finds that in practice courts are not. 
They often assume provisions to be self-executing only if they create rights for the 
individual or they assume non-self-execution when direct application might cause 
undesired consequences. The latter of course leads to violation of the treaty norm and 
when the provision is not implemented in some way or other the pacta sunt servanda 
principle is violated as well. 
 
4.3 Freedom of implementation 
International law itself does not proscribe how it should be applied or enforced at the 
national level. Treaties for example refer to "respect and ensure respect"32 or "… in 
accordance with its constitutional processes … to adopt such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant."33 The first is rather open, leaving it to the state how to respect and ensure 
respect, whereas the second phrase is an instruction to implementation, but how the 
rights should be implemented is left to the state. The only norm is that the national 
legislation should give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. As a rule states 
are free as to the implementation and fulfilment of their obligations under international 
                                             
32  Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions. 
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law, as long as they meet their obligations under international law and do not violate the 
pacta sunt seranda principle. 34 The origin of the freedom of implementation stems first of 
all from the idea of the sovereignty of the state. Separation of powers and the, either or 
not democratic, legitimacy of the law for example are derived from the idea of state 
sovereignty. A strict regime of international rules of implementation would infringe on 
these and other prerogatives of the state. It could also interfere with democratic rights, as 
at the international level negotiations are often performed by the executive, diplomats and 
professional, non-elected/non-political, civil servants. A second, more practical, reason 
for freedom of implementation is that international law is negotiated by multiple parties, 
what may lead to vagueness and uncertainties in treaties. States are considered to have 
better knowledge of their own legal system and its peculiarities and are supposed to be 
better able to implement their international obligations effectively. However, a 
counterargument could be that a more strict rule of implementation might lead to more 
equality between states as to the fulfilment of their international obligations and a better 
effectuation of international law. States may know best how to effectively implement 
international obligations into their own legal system, this does not mean that they will 
always do it, regardless their possible influence during the negotiations and the possibility 
of making reservations. And while implementing, is international law adapted to national 
law or the other way around? A remnant of the monistic-dualistic dichotomy? This may 
lead to subtle differences. While the freedom of implementation rule is uncontroversial 
and states can freely separate national and international law and choose which organ will 
enforce the international obligations as well as demand reciprocity from other states or 
make judicial application subject to the doctrine of self-executing treaties, according to 
Ferdinandusse, the freedom of implementation should not be overestimated. Once a 
treaty is signed and ratified a state is bound by it based on the pacta sunt servanda rule. 
As said, states have to effectively comply with the treaty they freely entered into. 
Nevertheless, they are able to legislate in violation of their international obligations. It is 
then left to the courts to either or not apply international law. It appears that national 
courts are not consistent in their response to breaches of the pacta sunt servanda rule 
and look "predominantly and sometimes even exclusively to national law in order to 
decide whether and to what extent to give effect to international law."35 Thus allowing 
                                                                                                                       
33  Article 2, paragraph 2 ICCPR. 
34  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 132, not 794. 
35  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 135. 
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violations of international obligations by the national executive and/or legislature. On the 
other hand, it appears that, based on separation of powers and the pacta sunt servanda 
rule, national courts often strictly adhere to international obligations, limiting the freedom 
of implementation of the state, normally when the state has had time to legislate, but 
failed to do so at all or not effectively. In the next paragraph will discuss the limitations of 
the freedom of implementation rule. This is relevant as a general international obligation 
of states of direct application of international norms would not be compatible with the 
freedom of implementation rule. As said, limitations and to what extent they apply may 
give some insight as to the possibilities of direct effect of treaty obligations.  
 
4.4 Limitations to the freedom of implementation rule 
According to Ferdinandusse36 the extent of freedom of implementation is often 
overestimated by scholars and national courts, resulting in the idea that national law 
determines the effect of international law in the internal legal order of a state. He finds 
reasons to doubt this as (i) many national courts do take international law into account in 
their interpretation of national law based on consistent interpretation, which I will return to 
later, (ii) a historical analysis of the reception of international law in various legal orders 
shows that originally courts perceived a validity of international law into the domestic 
legal order based on international law itself, as at the time no national rule existed that 
required this, (iii) international procedural norms conflict with the idea of the necessity of 
a national rule, e.g. the duty to refrain from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty 
before its entry into force, (iv) national courts apply international procedural rules 
routinely, although it must be said that they are often quite strict as to international rules 
creating individual rights and duties, (v) in several cases Latin-American courts used 
article 2737 VCLT to overrule the freedom of implementation and pass by the national 
executive and legislature, as they held that this article requires state organs to give 
primacy to treaty obligations and ensure them effective application even in the face of 
contrary national law or gaps therein.38 As a reaction to the last point: what does it mean 
to "perform a treaty" and what is a "failure" to do so? As seen above, article 2, paragraph 
2 of the ICCPR is quite clear about the implementation into national law of the rights 
                                             
36  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 140. 
37  This article reads: A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty. 
38 Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 144.  
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recognized in the covenant, but as to the extent of the implementation only the words 
"necessary to give effect" can be of guidance, leaving it to the state to decide what is 
necessary to give effect. This makes the obligation to implement an obligation sec. 
Consequently, the question arises: when is a treaty performed? And what about this 
question when no implementation is proscribed by the treaty, as is the case with the 
Geneva Conventions? The answer may lie with the abovementioned principle of 
consistent interpretation. It has a long history and is found in states all over the world. In 
such a way even, that according to Ferdinandusse it appears to be a general principle of 
law in the sense of article 38 paragraph 1 sub c of the ICJ Statute.39 In short, it is best 
explained as "an international duty for national courts to interpret, within their 
constitutional mandates, their national law in the light of international law".40 There are 
two different ways to do this. One way is to interpret according to the intent of the 
(national) legislature. This means that national law is interpreted according to 
international law and only if the (national) legislature explicitly violates international law 
and motivates why, the court will set international obligations aside. In fact, it is national 
law rather than international law which is respected. The other way focuses entirely on 
international law and the fulfilment of the obligations that flow from it instead of 
interpreting national law according to international law. Whatever way is used, most 
important is that the principle of consistent interpretation can limit the freedom of 
implementation: (i) it contradicts the idea that national law determines the effect of 
international law in the internal legal order and (ii) it can bypass obstacles created by 
national law as to implementation and application of international law in national courts. 
The principle of consistent interpretation can therefore influence the justiciability of rules 
of international law. Ferdinandusse does not distinguish between a treaty that proscribes 
implementation like the ICCPR and a treaty that does not, like the Geneva Conventions. 
In the next paragraph we will see that Ferdinandusse assumes that international human 
rights law and criminal law are part of, what he calls, international law of a humanitarian 
character. As for the principle of consistent interpretation it does not matter whether a 
treaty is implemented or not. Not only in case of the second abovementioned variant of 
the principle, when international obligations need to be fulfilled regardless national law, 
but also as to the first variant, when national law is interpreted according to international 
law. If the treaty was implemented, but does nevertheless not comply with international 
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law, the national court will apply international law, unless the legislature explicitly violated 
the pacta sunt servanda rule and motivated why. In case the treaty was not implemented, 
the national court will interpret whatever rule exists in national law and apply international 
law if the national rules do not comply with it, unless, again, the national legislature 
explicitly violated the pacta sunt servanda rule and motivates why. The next question is 
whether the freedom of implementation applies equally to all norms of international law. 
Within the scope of this thesis, international humanitarian law, which the Geneva 
Conventions are part of, is the specific field to look at. 
 
4.5 International law of a humanitarian character 
As said above in Ferdinandusse's view international law of a humanitarian character 
applies not only to international humanitarian law but also to international human rights 
law and criminal law. What these three bodies of law have in common is that here 
international law governs rights and duties of individuals and one could ponder if in such 
case the state's freedom of implementation is the same as with regards to other bodies of 
international law governing inter-state law. As said, courts do not easily apply 
international law creating individual rights and duties. 
Ferdinandusse distinguishes three characteristics of international law of a humanitarian 
character that may set it apart from general international law in such a way that a 
modification of the freedom of implementation rule may be justified. 
● Absence of reciprocity 
 The Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and several human rights 
bodies, e.g. the ICCPR and the IACHR, are considered to be multilateral 
agreements creating binding commitments for states to respect human dignity 
and the rights of the individual within their jurisdiction, irrespective of the acts of 
the other state parties to these conventions.  
● Limitation of the principle of consent 
 The Human Rights Committee has asserted repeatedly that "human rights 
treaties devolve with territory". A state can therefore not choose to be bound by 
the ICCPR or not when it acquires territory from a state party, nor can states 
denounce of withdraw from this covenant. The ICJ has stated that humanitarian 
law is to be observed by all states whether or not they have ratified the 
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conventions that contain it, because it constitutes intransgressible principles of 
international law.41
● More lenient demands for the formation of customary humanitarian law 
 The emphasis being more on opino iuris than on state practice. The ad hoc 
tribunals deduced individual criminal responsibility for acts in internal armed 
conflicts by relying on it.42
As to the first bullet point, as said above the Geneva Conventions do not oblige states to 
implement them as for example article 2, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR does and therefore 
do not become national law. Despite the binding commitments for states as to human 
dignity in the Geneva Conventions, I believe there still is the element of reciprocity, even 
if only a remnant, not only because they remain inter-state law, but also, and more 
strongly, as they apply in a situation of conflict when the relation between states is at its 
worst, feeding the reciprocity element. As Ferdinandusse does not distinguish between 
international law and implemented international law the reciprocity aspect becomes less 
important. 
With the development of international human rights law, international humanitarian law 
has moved away from its origin and has become more and more a lex specialis of the 
genus international human rights law, which is of a more universal and unconditional 
character and applies always, in war and peace. Mostly under the auspices of scholars, 
NGO's, international courts and ad hoc tribunals, attempts to diminish the roles of the 
principle of reciprocity and consent of states are made in order to enhance the efficacy of 
international law of a humanitarian character. However, we should bear in mind that their 
findings may not and probably are not consistent with existing law. An exception to the 
rule can probably be found as to core standards of humanity, but these are rather limited 
in number.  
That being so, can international law of a humanitarian character limit the freedom of 
implementation based on its particular position within international law? Human rights 
bodies, especially Human Rights Committee, often argue the necessity of a specific legal 
regime in order to ensure effective enforcement of international law of a humanitarian 
character, either through a significant restriction of states' freedom of implementation or, 
rather, through mandatory direct applicability. There is logic in this as "[i]f some 
                                             
41  ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 79 (quoting 
Corfu Channel 1949, 1949 ICJ 22). 
42  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 153 and following. 
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international norms are so fundamental that they bind States per se regardless of their 
consent, while proceedings on the national level provide the most, or even only, effective 
means of enforcement, it is difficult to accept that the applicability of those norms in 
national courts is subject to the discretion of the State."43 However, although states may 
limit their freedom of implementation for international norms of a humanitarian character 
and national courts have limited the principle of reciprocity or a state's freedom to 
disregard signed, unratified treaties, in many other cases these norms were treated the 
same as any other norms of general international law. It can therefore only be concluded 
that the position of international law of a humanitarian character is in development, in a 
sense that there is a certain tendency to limit the freedom of implementation of states, but 
this should not be overstated.44 I will now turn to David's opinion on jus cogens, to see if 
a wider application of the Geneva Conventions, more specifically to non-international 
conflicts, is possible. 
 
4.6 Jus cogens
Although never "officially" proclaimed to be jus cogens David finds three reasons to 
consider the law of armed conflict to be part of it. 
● The specific nature of the law of armed conflict. 
 The law of armed conflict concurs with the non-derogable rights of human rights 
instruments as they are both minimal norms. As the application of the law of 
armed conflict is the result of the violation of a norm of jus cogens – the 
prohibition of recourse to force – David considers the law of armed conflict to be 
part of jus cogens itself. 
● The law of armed conflict corresponds with the definition of jus cogens. 
 The Hague law of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions contain norms accepted 
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole. 
 David deduces the imperative character from article 1 common to the Geneva 
Conventions which states that the conventions should be "respected" and 
"ensured to be respected" "in all circumstances". This is stricter than article 26 
VCLT which states that treaties must be performed "in good faith". 
                                             
43  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 163. 
44  Ferdinandusse 2006, p. 163. 
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 Furthermore, the law of armed conflict cannot be denounced and insofar as it 
can (e.g. the Geneva Conventions), the Martens clause45 applies and although 
hard to determine the provisions this clause would apply to, David assumes it 
concerns those provisions which are "protected"  because they contain (i) 
expressions that underline their imperative character, or (ii) the prohibition of 
reprisals, or (iii) an international criminal penalization. This hard kernel 
constitutes minimal humanitarian jus cogens. 
 David refers to the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case of the 
ICJ, where the court did not express itself on the question whether humanitarian 
law could be considered as jus cogens, but it stated: "It is undoubtedly because a 
great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and "elementary considerations 
of humanity" as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu 
Channel case (ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22), that the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules 
are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions 
that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law." According to David intransgressible principles and 
imperative norms from which no derogation is possible46 are "chou vert et vert 
chou" and he concludes that the ICJ implicitly confirmed that most of the 
provisions of humanitarian law are jus cogens norms. 
● Factors of unassailability of some of the provisions. 
 A first factor David finds in the wording of some provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, where the imperative character is underlined. 
 A second factor lies in the prohibition of reprisals and reciprocity. 
 A third factor is the individual criminal responsibility on top of the states' 
responsibility.  
 Because these provisions are more obligatory than others, David considers them 
jus cogens rules. 
It is very difficult to comment on this, as jus cogens rules are hard to prove. I would say 
that as to the law of armed conflict, not the provisions, but the underlying values are jus 
                                             
45  …remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. 
46  Article 53 VCLT. 
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cogens: the right to life and the right to physical integrity. But, if the Geneva Conventions 
are jus cogens norms, they are undoubtedly applicable to non-international conflicts, as 
according to article 53 VCLT no derogation from these norms is possible, not even a 
state's sovereignty can be reason. Unless, of course, these conventions are jus cogens 
norms as they are: not applicable to non-international conflicts. But then, what is left of 
the content of the notion of jus cogens? It seems to me one has to be restrictive when 
attributing jus cogens to treaties, if not, the notion becomes void, hence my opinion of the 
underlying values. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The Geneva Conventions are traditional inter-state treaties and, like human rights 
treaties, they create duties and rights for individuals. Not only in the vertical sense, 
between individual and state, but also horizontally, between individuals. If a direct effect 
would apply to these conventions it would apply as they are and would therefore not 
extend their scope to non-international conflicts. Ferdinandusse distinguishes three 
characteristics that may set international law of a humanitarian character apart from 
general international law in such a way that a modification of the freedom of 
implementation rule may be justified: the absence of reciprocity, the limitation of the 
principle of consent and more lenient demands for the formation of customary 
humanitarian law. One could ponder that if international law of a humanitarian character 
would indeed be set apart from general international law, could the underlying reason be 
enough to apply the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts? When I look at 
the motivation behind the three characteristics I would say that the aspect that binds the 
three is respect for human dignity. When states would acknowledge that human dignity is 
of such importance that it sets international law of a humanitarian character or, in the 
narrow sense the Geneva Conventions, apart from general international law such that it 
limits the freedom of implementation rule, in my opinion this would result in the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts. If human dignity is 
considered by states to be of such importance as to create direct effect, states would 
want to protect it in the best possible way during internal conflict, which means apply 
those norms that apply to international conflict. In my opinion the Geneva Conventions 
are applicable to non-international conflicts as soon as humanitarian law has direct effect. 
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As to David's view of the law of armed conflict being jus cogens norms I believe this is not 
yet so, although a development may be in that direction. 
As it appears to be so that states not only determine their internal affairs, but also the 
measure of protection of universal and inherent rights, such as human dignity, it is 
necessary to take a look at sovereignty. 
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5 Sovereignty
 
5.1 General 
Originally sovereignty was connected with an individual, the "king". He had absolute 
power over his territory and everyone and everything in it. His power was directly derived 
from god in the Christian societies or from a supreme power differently named in non-
Christian societies. Jean Bodin was the first to provide a theory of state sovereignty in his 
Six livres de la République published in 1576. He separates sovereignty as a function 
from the person of the sovereign. It can be attributed to any person or institution. About a 
hundred years later, Thomas Hobbes creates the first version of the contract theory. 
Sovereignty is the result of a contract between individuals and is therefore no longer 
original and unconditional. Fifty years after Hobbes John Locke derives his theory on 
sovereignty from a contract between individuals and the sovereign, who can be held 
accountable for violation of the contract. Locke finds it important to limit the powers of the 
sovereign and ensure a division of powers and constitutional control. A few years later 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau submits the exercise of sovereignty of political institutions to the 
respect of the general will and political sovereignty becomes a reflection of popular 
sovereignty. From then on sovereignty and democracy are bound and sovereignty is 
considered absolute when original and limited when it corresponds to derived political or 
institutional sovereignty. To be sovereign means to have supreme legal authority, 
therefore not to be subjected to any legal order superior to ones own. However, the state 
is considered to be subjected to norms of morals in general.47 The Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) is often seen as the birth of the concept of the modern state, which means that the 
principle of territorial delimitation of state authority and the principle of non-intervention 
were formally established. In international law the minimum requirements for recognition 
of a state are (i) territory, (ii) people in it, and (iii) government which controls the territory 
with the people and is independent of other states. In this last element of the state 
sovereignty is embedded.  
                                             
47  Kelsen 1960. 
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5.2 Internal / external sovereignty 
Internal control or ultimate power and external independence are the two sides of the 
sovereign coin. Besson48 considers these two sides to be historically and conceptually 
linked, but nevertheless thinks it important to distinguish between them for three reasons, 
(i) "different institutions exercise sovereignty in both cases." The executive acting as 
sovereign in external affairs and the legislature as such in internal affairs, (ii) "their 
functions differ". Internal sovereignty covers all political and legal matters and external 
sovereignty usually only cooperation between distinct sovereign entities, (iii) difference in 
status, as internal sovereignty is final/ultimate and external is equal at the most. Although 
the said differences do apply, the executive and the legislature are organs of the state 
and it is the state which is sovereign, not its organs. As said, internal and external 
sovereignty are two sides of the same coin. If one of the features of state sovereignty is 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, meaning the competence to decide ones own competence, then 
all three differences fall together in one sovereignty. The state decides which 
organ/institution is best suited to fulfill a certain task, also called the principle of 
subsidiarity or power allocation principle. For internal affairs that can be the national 
legislature, but, as is the case with the European Union49, it can very well be an 
institution created outside of the national sphere if (a) state(s) consider(s) this to be 
(economically) better. Internal and external sovereignty may differ in functions, but that is 
caused by the third point Besson makes, the difference in status.  
My objection to Besson's position is that the more the two sides of the sovereign coin are 
separated, the more the attribution of a task to a state's institution becomes fixed. In my 
view the point of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is the flexibility of the state to adjust 
competences to a changing world, demanding reactions from a state. Over time, many 
changes that may influence the sovereignty of the state occurred, e.g. establishment of 
the UN and the EU, emergence of and increasing influence of NGO's and multinational 
corporations, economic globalization, the importance of human rights and, to a lesser 
extent, jus cogens norms. Some of these phenomena, however, were initiated by states 
and may therefore be less of an erosion of state sovereignty, than an exercise of it. 
States may be well aware that because of globalization and an increase in 
interdependence between them, cooperation becomes more important. Is it not a 
exercise of sovereignty of the state to decide upon it's own competence? If, however, 
                                             
48  Besson 2006, p. 151. 
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sovereignty is seen in the narrow sense, as power, one perceives a change in state 
competence as a limitation of that power. Whereas it could simply be another division of 
competences as a necessary reaction to changes in the world. Due to the 
abovementioned globalization and interdependence of states, decision making may have 
shifted to the international level in the past decennia and states have responded to that 
evolution by an increase in their cooperation. Hence, an increase in focus on international 
politics and as a result an increase of international agreements, international institutions 
and international courts. The question then arises whether in this process sovereignty is 
transferred to institutions outside of the state, as for example the EU, which is considered 
to be supranational.  
 
5.3 Transfer of sovereignty 
The transfer of sovereignty is not without problems, for example how much sovereignty 
can be transferred for a state to remain a state. This problem cannot be solved by 
distinguishing between internal and external sovereignty, as it is not only external 
sovereignty that is transferred. The point in the transfer of sovereignty is that 
supranational legislation affects the internal legal order directly. This too, shows that the 
distinction between internal and external sovereignty, even if considered linked as 
Besson does, is a problematic one, as supranational legislation is a result of the exercise 
of external sovereignty, but nevertheless restrains the internal sovereignty as well. The 
transfer of sovereignty can therefore only be both internal and external. But, to return to 
the question at hand, to what extent can sovereignty be transferred? For example, if a 
state transfers 50% of its sovereignty is it still a state? Or should one look at the kind of 
sovereignty transferred to decide whether a state is still sovereign. This leads to the 
question whether a hierarchy exits in law in a sense that e.g. private law is of another 
ranking than criminal law or administrative law. Could law that regulates state actions be 
of a higher level? That could be human rights law. But it would not be realistic to assume 
that, because as soon as states' sovereignty is limited by international treaties, states feel 
an urge to implementation at national level, where they can decide who does what and to 
what extent, as we have seen in the chapter on direct effect.  
A spin-off of the transfer of sovereignty to supranational organizations like the EU is, that 
sovereignty is detached from democracy with which it is traditionally linked. In case of the 
                                                                                                                       
49  Hereinafter: EU. 
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EU a parliament exists, but it does not have as much influence as a national parliament in 
general has and the distance from Brussels to citizens in the EU does not only exist in 
kilometers. The democratic influence decreases as sovereignty is transferred to 
supranational organs. 
Another problem in the EU, created by the concept of transfer of sovereignty, is that of 
hierarchy of rules. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms50 is a, one could say, traditional human rights treaty, as it 
contains broad terms and must be implemented at national level. The implementation of 
human rights treaties by states at national level is generally seen as a necessity as to the 
efficacy of exercise of their rights by individuals. Enforcement at a national level is easier 
than at an international level and therefore the protection of the rights is better ensured at 
the national level. The result of implementation, however, is that the protected rights 
"degrade" from international law to national law. In itself not a problem, but within the EU 
it leads a subordination of human rights law to economic law, the latter being 
supranational. An example being the case of Viking Line51 where the right to strike may 
be considered national law and therefore subordinate to EU law, as a result of which the 
strike may be prohibited. An extraordinary result, as every state becoming a member of 
the EU automatically becomes a party to all its conventions, including the ECHR, which, 
as a treaty, is not national law. Furthermore, it seems to be in violation of the object and 
purpose of the ECHR. The reasoning of the European Court of Justice52 is that the EU is 
more than the sum of the parties and that the EU is not a party to the ECHR and can 
therefore not be bound by it. In its decision in the Van Gend & Loos case53 the ECJ 
explained this "more" in this way: "The objective of the EEC treaty, which is to establish a 
common market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the 
community, implies that this treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates 
mutual obligations between the contracting parties." The ECJ sees a confirmation of its 
point of view in (i) the preamble referring not only to governments, but also to people, (ii) 
the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which 
affects states and their citizens, and (iii) the nationals of the states party are called upon 
to cooperate through the intermediary of the European parliament and the Economic and 
                                             
50  Hereinafter: ECHR. 
51  European Court of Justice, C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish 
Seamens's Union/Viking Line, no decision taken yet. 
52  Hereinafter: ECJ. 
53  See also Van Gend & Loos, case 26/62, p. 3. 
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Social Committee. The "more" the ECJ refers to seems to be based on "direct effect" of 
the ECC treaty towards the states' citizens. As it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
research the finesses of European law I will leave it to this. My point was to prove that the 
concept of transfer of sovereignty may lead to unsolvable problems. 
Another objection I have to the separation of internal and external sovereignty is that it 
does not concur with state practice, it seems too artificial. The executive may act 
externally, but it also acts internally. It may actually be the same people in both cases. 
They may put on another hat when negotiating with their colleagues in other states, they 
still represent their own state and the internal state policy will influence the external 
negotiations. They may even be chosen by the state to participate in certain negotiations 
because they have knowledge on a specific – internal state –  field. The same applies to 
other distinctions often made as to sovereignty: absolute/limited and unitary/divided. By 
making these distinctions the state and its function is chopped up in small parts more or 
less perceived as autonomous, but somehow also linked. But this is first a simplification 
of reality and second the state becomes an almost virtual living thing, a thing in itself. A 
state, however, is a complex organization of human beings, with multiple – organizational 
– subdivisions. To quote Besson: "The problem with this kind of model of pooled, divided 
or shared sovereignty, however, is that by being everywhere, it seems that sovereignty is 
nowhere particularly important".54 She makes a plea for cooperative sovereignty, based 
on a combination of subsidiarity and sovereignty. This corresponds, according to Besson, 
with the general development of multilevel governance in a post-national constellation. 
Sovereign political entities can no longer exercise their traditional competences and 
function alone, as they overlap within the same territory and apply to the same legal and 
political community.  
  
5.4 State sovereignty in the international field 
What happens in the international field where states act as equal sovereign entities? First 
of all, in the international field not only states operate, as said above, there are all kinds 
of actors as NGO's and multinational corporations, as well as several phenomena like 
globalization, economics, environmental issues, poverty, epidemics or natural disasters. 
Secondly, actors as well as phenomena have become more and more interconnected, 
because mankind expanded over the years, as did its influence on the world as a whole. 
                                             
54  Besson 2006, p. 155. 
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Sovereign states therefore do not have a choice but to cooperate, not only between 
them, but also with the other actors in the international field, some of which may be 
based in certain states, but their objectives can be quite different from those of the state 
they are based in. The interests of all actors become intertwined and decision making is 
shifted to the international level. The more this happens, the more important the state 
becomes as intermediate between people and the level where decisions are made. One 
could ponder, therefore, what interests are pursued when NGO's, international tribunals, 
publicists and others claim that state sovereignty is being eroded and perceive this to be 
a good thing. Especially in the light of human rights. 
Kelsen55 finds that when "international law obligates and authorizes the state to behave 
in a certain way [this] means that international law leaves it to the state to determine 
which (group of) individual(s) by their behavior will fulfill the obligations imposed by 
international law" as "only the behavior of human beings can be the content of legal 
obligations and legal rights". The state as a subject of international law is the 
personification of the national legal order. According to Kelsen the problem of sovereignty 
of the state is the problem of the sovereignty of the national legal order in its relation to 
the international legal order. This relationship is either dualistic, which means that both 
legal orders are simultaneously valid, or monistic, in which view the national and 
international legal order form a unity. The dualistic view cannot be maintained if it is 
recognized that international law delegates to the state to allocate its obligations and 
rights under international law to its organs. If the monistic view is adapted the next 
question is whether there is a primacy of national law or a primacy of international law. In 
the first case international law is deemed valid if a state recognizes it as valid for its 
organs, either expressly of tacitly. Sovereignty of a state means that it is presupposed 
that the national legal order is a supreme order, which is not derived from a superior 
order. In the view of primacy of international law the validity of national law is sought in 
international law and this is done through the principle of efficacy. As said above, for a 
state to be recognized by international law it needs (i) territory, (ii) people, (iii) effective 
control and (iv) independence of other states. In this case international law is superior 
and universal and the national legal orders coexist and are subjected to superior 
international law. Kelsen offers a very interesting theory: if the primacy of national law is 
supposed, then only one state can be sovereign. If state A recognizes international law 
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as its national law, then international law becomes now national law of state A. According 
to international law other legal orders are "states" if state A's law recognizes them as 
such. As a consequence of the primacy of national law the other states must be regarded 
as subordinated to the national legal order of state A, which includes international law. 
Hence they cannot be presupposed as sovereign. Only state A, on the basis of which 
recognition of international law took place, can be presupposed to be sovereign, for only 
this national law is not subordinated to international law as the latter is a part of this 
national law. This, however, is not what states have in mind when they suppose a 
primacy of national law. Whether international law is considered to be valid within 
national law or the other way around does not affect the content of both international or 
national law. Kelsen refers to the Bezugssystem of Max Planck who explains this: 
whether the sun turns around the earth or the earth around the sun is a matter of a 
different system of reference. "In the antagonism of these two formulations there is 
neither contradiction nor obscurity; there are only two different ways of viewing the 
obect". According to the theory of relativity, both ways of viewing are correct and 
legitimate. It is impossible to decide between them. The science of law can only describe 
the two systems and ascertain that one of the two has to be accepted in order to decide 
the relationship between national  and international law. This decision is outside the 
science of law. It is therefore, according to Kelsen, a political decision to favor the 
primacy of national law over the primacy of international law or the other way around. He 
warns to keep in mind that the first does not entail declining the ideal of a world 
organization as the latter does not decline the ideal of state sovereignty, however, the 
first is an iron part of the political ideology of imperialism and the latter a decisive part of 
the political ideology of pacifism.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In my view sovereignty lies fully and undivided with the states. Not only would a division 
or a transfer of sovereignty lead to problems of hierarchy, it could also infringe on 
democracy, as international representation is quite often an executive, non-political, 
affair. Furthermore, as the interdependence of states has increased, so did their 
cooperation which in turn has lead to an increase in international law, in which states 
form the intermediate between their nationals and the international level. The influence of 
international law into the national legal order is a political decision, as Kelsen pointed out, 
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and in a democracy this decision can be influenced by the state's nationals. An example 
of which was the rejection of the European constitution by the French and Dutch peoples. 
Although not a fortunate one, as we have seen above.  
As the influence of international law on the national legal order increases the necessity of 
a proper adjudication increases too. In the next chapter I will show that the prosecution of 
violations of international law of a humanitarian character is preferred to take place at the 
national level as the guarantees for a fair trial are best protected there.  
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6 International Courts
 
6.1 General
The events that took place in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda shocked the world 
because of its brutality, its magnitude and the fact that this all took place among citizens 
of the same state, neighbors. Two international tribunals were established and although 
they served a worthy goal, one could ponder if this was the proper route to follow. As a 
women from Belgrade told me: "If the money spent on the tribunal was used to help us 
restore the peace in our country, try our own and build the economy, we would have 
been further than we are now. Do not get me wrong, it is good to bring the criminals to 
justice, but some of the worst are still there." If justice must prevail, it should do so 
according to the law. The more the deviation from existing rules, the less credited the 
result. As an example I will now discuss parts of the Tadić Case on jurisdiction. 
 
6.2 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
The defense lawyers of Duske Tadić had argued before the Trial Chamber that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia56 was unlawfully founded. The 
Trial Chamber, however, declared itself incompetent to decide upon this argument. In the 
interlocutory appeal before the Appeals Chamber the prosecutor argued in support of a 
negative answer as to the appealability of this decision "based on the distinction between 
the validity of the creation of the International Tribunal and its jurisdiction. The second 
aspect alone would be appealable whilst the legality and primacy of the International 
Tribunal could not be challenged in appeal."57 The Appeals Chamber finds this a narrow 
interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction which falls foul of a modern vision of the 
administration of justice and examines the constitutionality of the Tribunal.58 The 
argument of the defense was based on the fact that the ICTY was created by a Security 
Council resolution59 and not "established by law" as is provided in article 14, paragraph 1 
of the ICCPR, which reads:  
                                             
56  Hereinafter: ICTY. 
57 Tadic (IT-94-1), Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 
§ 4. 
58  Tadic (IT-94-1), Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 
§ 41. 
59  Resolution 827, 25 May 1993. 
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 "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations 
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."  
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR and article 8, paragraph 1 of the ACHR have similar 
texts. The ICCPR is an international human rights treaty achieved through the United 
Nations. The other two treaties are regional human rights treaties. As the condition that a 
tribunal should be established by law is found in three major human rights treaties, it can 
be accepted that in international law the establishment of a tribunal by law is one of the 
guarantees to a fair trial. The question arises what is meant by "law". Law can be 
interpreted in the strict way, the written text, act, bill or, in international law: the 
convention. Law can also be interpreted more broadly and referring to article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute where the sources of international law are listed, this "law" contains not only 
the strict interpretation of law, the text, but also custom, principles, decisions and 
teachings of qualified publicists as well. It may be clear that the stricter interpretation is 
meant with "established by law". In international law that would be a treaty.  
The Appeals Chamber finds three possible interpretations of the term "established by 
law": 
1. Established by a legislature; 
2. Established by a body which, though not a parliament, has a limited power to 
take binding decisions; 
3. The establishment of the tribunal must be in accordance with the rule of law. 
As to the first interpretation the Appeals Chamber assumes that the guarantee 
"established by law" is based on a division of powers, such that the administration of 
justice is regulated by laws made by the legislature. As the division of powers does not 
apply to the international community, because a parliament does not exist at this level, 
and more specifically the United Nations does not know a division of powers, the Appeals 
Chamber concludes: "Consequently the separation of powers element of the requirement 
that a tribunal be "established by law" finds no application in an international law setting. 
The aforementioned principle can only impose an obligation on States concerning the 
functioning of their own national systems." It is of course true that at the international 
level there is no legislature parallel to the municipal level. This is caused by the fact that 
the international community is set up as a community of independent, equal, sovereign 
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states60 in a, so to speak, private law, a horizontal, setting. The sovereign states 
constitute the legislature at the international level and law at this level is an agreement 
between equal partners, a treaty. My comment to the first interpretation of the Appeals 
Chamber is that the parallel drawn should be mutatis mutandis and not strict. 
As to the second interpretation the defense lawyers had argued that, as there is no 
division of powers within the United Nations, a tribunal can only be established through a 
amendment of the United Nations Charter. The Appeals Chamber disagrees stating that 
the Security Council has the competence to create an international tribunal if it is acting 
pursuant to an authority found within its constitution, the United Nations Charter. We now 
have to make a side step to another part of the Appeals Chamber's decision where it 
considers whether the Security Council could establish the tribunal as a measure under 
chapter VII of the Charter. According to the Appeals Chamber it could. I do not agree. 
The system of chapter VI and VII is one of increasing intensity of a dispute and an 
accordingly increasing reaction of the Security Council. Chapter VI concerns "pacific 
settlement of disputes". Disputes or situations that may lead to international friction can 
be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly (article 35 
UN Charter) and parties are supposed to seek a solution through e.g. negotiation, 
arbitration or any other peaceful means (article 33 UN Charter). Actions of the Security 
Council are recommendations. In case of chapter VII, however, the situation has 
worsened and a threat to the peace exist or a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression has taken place. According to article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression and decide whether it will turn to recommendations, the chapter VI route, or 
turn to chapter VII. In the latter case it can choose between article 40, provisional 
measures, according to the Appeals Chamber cooling-off or holding operations, article 
41, preventive measures, more coercive, as economic sanctions or severance of 
diplomatic relations, anything but the use of armed forces, or article 42 which is, as an 
ultimum remedium, the use of air, sea or land forces, therefore enforcement measures, 
even intervention (articles 43 through 51 jo. article 2, paragraph 7). The Appeals 
Chamber considers the establishment of ad hoc tribunals one of the measures under 
article 41. Although I believe that the measures to be taken under article 41 are not 
                                             
60 Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, 
General Assembly and article 2, paragraph 1 UN Charter. 
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limited by the ones mentioned there, I do not see, with the defense lawyers, how a 
tribunal can be a preventive measure, it seems to me more a measure after the fact. 
Furthermore, article 7 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter enumerates the principal organs of 
the United Nations and according to paragraph 2 subsidiary organs may be established 
in accordance with the Charter. As to subsidiary organs established by the Security 
Council this means, according to article 29 UN Charter, that these must be necessary for 
the performance of its, the Security Council's, functions. The question is what the 
functions of the Security Council are, and more specifically what its functions are under 
article 41 of the UN Charter, as this is an specific situation: threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression. In his separate opinion, paragraph 64, judge R.S. Sidhwa 
refers to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion in "The Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by 
the United Nations Administration Tribunal" case61 where, according to Sidhwa, the ICJ 
"explicitly confirmed that a principal organ of the United Nations could create a subsidiary 
judicial body…"62 However, in this case a tribunal was established by the General 
Assembly which tried administrative cases within the United Nations. On page 58, top, 
the ICJ states: "Accordingly, the court finds that the power to establish a tribunal to do 
justice between the Organization [the United Nations] and the staff members may be 
exercised by the General Assembly". Therefore, not a general, as Sidhwa sees it, but a 
specific confirmation. The ICJ bases the power to establish the tribunal on article 7, 
paragraph 2 of the UN Charter: "Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may 
be established in accordance with the present Charter", article 22 of the UN Charter: 
"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for 
the performance of its functions" and article 101, paragraph 1, where the General 
Assembly is given power to regulate staff relations: "The Staff shall be appointed by the 
Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly". On page 61 
of the Advisory Opinion the ICJ holds that the General Assembly "…was not delegating 
the performance of its own functions: it was exercising a power which it had under the 
Charter to regulate staff functions." The General Assembly was given the power to make 
regulations, not the power to adjudicate particular cases. It was the Secretariat under 
articles 97 and 101 of the UN Charter and ultimately the Secretary-General, who decided 
upon individual cases before the Administrative Tribunal was established. 
                                             
61  S1954 ICJ Reports 47, p. 56-61C. 
62 Separate opinion judge Sidhwa on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 
www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/510027234562.htm. 
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We now return to the question of the Security Council's specific functions of article 41 of 
the UN Charter. According to article 24, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter the Security 
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security and according to paragraph 2 of the same article it shall act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. The purposes are found in article 1 of the 
UN Charter. Paragraph 1 applies to the present subject: "To maintain international peace 
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." [emphasis added] Can 
the establishment of a tribunal prevent, remove, suppress, adjust or settle a dispute? Or 
threats to the peace or acts of aggression? In casu: what is the effect of a tribunal in The 
Hague, the Netherlands, on an ethnic dispute in former Yugoslavia, deeply rooted in that 
society? According to Sidhwa on page 16, bottom, of his separate opinion, well founded 
opinions were given and assessments were made to the effect that the Tribunal would 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of the peace. To return to the UN Charter, 
article 24, paragraph 2 states that the Security Council has specific powers for the 
discharge of its duties and these are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. As seen 
above the specific powers attributed to the Security Council by article 41 of the UN 
Charter consist of coercive measures towards states. The examples given in this article 
are within the political setup of the UN organization: economic and diplomatic measures. 
The question is whether (i) criminal law fits in the political setup of the UN, combined with 
(ii) the fact that this concerns individuals, not states and (iii) the exception to the non-
intervention clause of 2, paragraph 7 UN Charter, articles 42-51, apply to actions by air, 
sea or land forces, military actions therefore aiming to stop the physical conflict and 
restore the peace. In my view article 41 UN Charter does not allow the intervention of the 
national judiciary. Drawing the parallel with the abovementioned ICJ case can only lead 
to the conclusion that the Security Council does not have the power to intervene in the 
national legal order by establishing a tribunal which adjudicates individuals. In short, the 
Security Council can take decisions to intervene physically, but not judicially. The specific 
guarantees of criminal law, where individuals need protection from the state in their role 
of suspect of a crime, protect in fact all citizens of a state against unauthorized behavior 
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of that state. Bringing criminal law to the international level implies bringing all guarantees 
of this specific kind of law to the international level too. However, if the structure of the 
international community and/or an international organization prohibit the full application of 
the criminal law guarantees the decision cannot but be to abandon the plan. Not only for 
the suspect, but also for the credibility of, in casu, the tribunal. The Appeals Chamber, 
searching for an equivalent of the national legislature, finds the Security Council 
competent to create an international tribunal if it is acting pursuant to an authority found 
within its constitution, the United Nations Charter. From the above it can be concluded 
that, according to the system of the UN Charter and the setup of the international 
community, the Security Council does not have this authority. My comment to the second 
interpretation of the Appeals Chamber is that the parallel between a national legislature 
and the Security Council as a body having limited power to take binding decisions does 
not apply, as within the system of the UN Charter the Security Council's power to take 
binding decisions does not amount to the intervention of the national legal order by trying 
individuals in criminal cases. 
As to the third interpretation the Appeals Chamber finds that "This appears to be the most 
sensible and most likely meaning of the term [established by law] in the context of 
international law. For a tribunal such as this one to be established according to the rule of 
law, it must be established in accordance with the proper international standards; it must 
provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity 
with internationally recognized human rights instruments." I agree, therefore, in 
conformity with the ICCPR, ECHR and the ACHR, which demand an establishment by 
law. As said, at the international level, law is an agreement between equal, sovereign 
states and to establish an international tribunal in conformity with international human 
rights instruments, it should have been established by a treaty.  
With the establishment of the ICTY, and the ICTR for that matter, the time element may 
have played a role. As can be seen from the establishment of the ICC, a treaty may have 
taken years. I believe that the ICTY and ICTR are tribunals, which provide the suspects 
the guarantees of a fair trial and are an example to the world that the violation of human 
rights to this extent is taken very serious by the international community, but these 
tribunals were not established within the constitutional powers endorsed to the Security 
Council by the UN Charter as measures under chapter VII, nor were they established by 
law. 
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Another point the defense in the Tadić case on jurisdiction made before the Appeals 
Chamber was the unjustified primacy of the Tribunal over competent domestic courts. 
Tadić was imprisoned in the Federal Republic of Germany and his case was under 
investigation there when the ICTY under article 9, paragraph 2 of its Statute requested 
the Federal Republic of Germany to defer to the competence of the ICTY, which it did. As 
Tadić was not on trial yet, according to the Appeals Chamber, he cannot challenge the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY based on the fact that he was on trial elsewhere. In my view, even 
if he would have been, according to article 9 of the ICTY Statute, the Tribunal could have 
made the request for deference as it can be done "At any stage of the procedure …" 
[emphasis added]. On the other hand, according to paragraph 1 of the same article the 
ICTY and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction. As the ICTY has to make a request 
for deference and the national court is not obliged to defer, the conclusion from both 
paragraphs of article 9 can only be that the ICTY does not have primacy over national 
courts. Furthermore, as said above in my conclusion on the second interpretation of the 
Appeals Chamber, the Security Council cannot intervene judicially in the national legal 
order. The primacy therefore, I would say, lies indeed with the national courts. Both the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, agreed to refer the 
case to the ICTY and as they did, as the Trial Chamber put it "…the accused cannot 
claim the rights that have been specifically waived by the States concerned. To allow the 
accused to do so would be to allow him to select the forum of his choice, contrary to the 
principles relating to coercive criminal jurisdiction."63 At the national level, I would add. 
Especially, according to the Appeals Chamber, as the crimes allegedly committed "do not 
affect the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind."64 
Furthermore, the Tribunal was established by the Security Council, an organ "empowered 
and mandated, by definition, to deal with trans-boundary matters or matters, which 
though domestic in nature, may affect international peace and security "65 and the 
concept of state sovereignty, where the claim i.a. was based on, should not be raised 
successfully against human rights. Furthermore, adoption of the United Nations Charter, 
achieved that states, when entering the United Nations, surrender some of their 
                                             
63 Decision at Trial, § 41.  
64  Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction, § 57. 
65  Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction, § 58. 
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sovereignty.66 Therefore, the ICTY has primacy over competent domestic courts. In the 
next paragraph we will see that according to the ICC Statute a different view is possible.  
The final point made by the defense was the jus de non evocando, the right not to be 
judged by an alien judge or, as the defense puts it, the right of the defendant to be tried 
by his national courts under his national laws. This principle can be used e.g. when 
extradition of a national is requested by a foreign state, but refused by the national's own 
state because of possible breaches of the fair trail principle, the possibility of torture or 
application of the death penalty. According to the Trial Chamber this principle can also be 
used to prevent a person being tried by a special tribunal, set up for a particular purpose 
or situation instead of a regular court. The ICTY, however, being established by the 
Security Council under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should not be 
considered to be such a court and the claim is dismissed. I do not agree, as the ICTY is 
exactly that: according to the preamble of its Statute this tribunal is "the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991". Article 1 of the ICTY Statute states the same when determining the 
Tribunal's competence. 
In my view, several situations of civil wars and internal conflicts have proved the 
necessity of national communities to try their own people either by way of tribunals or 
through reconciliation or truth commissions. This is a very important aspect for restoring 
trust, healing of the community and building true peace. That this is a long and difficult 
road is proved by South-Africa, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Serbia 
and Montenegro, South Korea, Uganda, Nigeria, Nepal, Haiti, East-Timor and more. 
In my view the arguments of the defense on the jurisdiction of the ICTY are justified. In 
the next paragraph I will compare the abovementioned arguments of the defense with the 
ICC Statute to find out whether a different conclusion is reached.  
 
6.3 International Criminal Court
The arguments on the jurisdiction of the ICTY that I looked at above were: 
1 The ICTY was not established by law, but by a Security Council resolution. 
                                             
66  As we have seen in the chapter on sovereignty, partial transfer of sovereignty leads to the question how 
much sovereignty can be transferred and still remain sovereign. A second objection I have here, is that 
the Charter itself considers the UN to be an organization of equal, sovereign states. It is not 
supranational. 
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2 Tadić was under investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
3 Primacy of the ICTY over national courts and jus de non evocando. 
4 Primacy of the ICTY based on violations of human rights that shock mankind. 
As to the first point we can be short. The ICC Statute is a treaty negotiated and 
concluded by sovereign states and when signed and ratified binds these states. As in 
international law this is the way law is created, the ICC is therefore established by 
(international) law. Under article 13 of the ICC Statute, sub b, the Security Council, acting 
under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, can refer a situation in which one or 
more crimes mentioned in article 5 of the ICC Statute appear to have been committed, to 
the prosecutor of the ICC. Although one can ponder it this would be a provisional or a 
preventive measure, as it is still a measure after the fact, at least the tribunal the situation 
is referred to complies with human rights treaties as to its establishment. According to 
article 16 the Security Council may request the ICC to stop any investigation or 
prosecution or not commence it when a resolution to that effect is adopted under chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter. Which is, in my view, a strange subordination of the 
ICC to the Security Council. Here, an international criminal court is subordinated to an 
organ of a political organization, the United Nations, in which organ not only just 15 
member states are represented, the five permanent members of this organ have a veto 
and three of them (US (signed 31.12.2000), Russia (signed 13.09.2000) and China (not 
signed)) have not ratified the ICC Statute. 
As to the second point, under article 17, paragraph 1, sub a of the ICC Statute a case is 
inadmissible when it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction 
over it. In Tadić case the ICC would not have requested to transfer the case to it, 
because it would have to declare the case inadmissible. Unless, the Federal Republic of 
Germany would prove to be unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation of 
prosecution (second part of article 17, paragraph 1, sub a). 
As to point 3, according to article 1 of the ICC Statute the ICC shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. From article 17 of the ICC Statute it can be concluded that 
the ICC gives primacy to national courts. The ICC can only try cases if the state 
concerned is unwilling or unable to prosecute, tries to shield the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility, causes unjustified delay in the proceedings inconsistent with the 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice, when the proceedings are not being 
conducted independently or impartially or when a total or substantial collapse or 
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unavailability of the national judicial system occurs. According to article 18, paragraph 2 
the prosecutor shall defer a situation to the state's investigation at the request of the state 
concerned, unless the pre-trial chamber, on the application of the prosecutor under article 
15, paragraph 3, decides to authorize the investigation. 
As to point 4, according to article 5 of the ICC Statute, paragraph 1 the jurisdiction of the 
ICC shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole, which are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression. As seen above, the ICC Statute gives primacy to national courts for all the 
crimes within its jurisdiction, which are the most serious crimes that shock mankind. No 
primacy therefore based on a particular intensity of violation. 
 
6.4 Conclusion
The criticism of the defense lawyers in the Tadić case as to the jurisdiction of the ICTY 
seems justified when the decisions of the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY are compared 
with the ICC Statute. For the most serious crimes as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity the ICC functions as a court of last resort. The primacy to adjudicate 
their nationals for these crimes lies with national courts.  
 
 
 55 
7 Conclusions
 
From the above research into the possibility of the application of the Geneva Conventions 
to non-international conflicts I can draw three conclusions. 
 
Over time the strict separation between the law of peace and the law of war has 
disappeared and the law of peace during times of conflict gained in importance. Human 
rights law, applicable during both peace and war, has made a strong development and 
the instruments protecting individuals in war time have become a lex specialis of human 
rights law. The overlap between the Geneva Conventions and human rights law is found 
in the right to life and the right to physical integrity. In my opinion there is enough basis to 
assume that these norms are peremptory norms. Therefore, not the law of armed conflict, 
but these underlying values are jus cogens norms. If the law of armed conflict would 
become jus cogens, the Geneva Conventions will be applicable to non-international 
conflicts as no derogation is possible from peremptory norms of international law. Not 
even based on sovereignty. 
 
I considered the three characteristics of Ferdinandusse which in his view may cause a  
limitation of the freedom of implementation of states for international law of a 
humanitarian character and found that their underlying, binding element is respect for 
human dignity. In my opinion, when states acknowledge that human dignity is of such 
importance that it sets international law of a humanitarian character apart from general 
international law such that it has direct effect into their national legal order, states have 
no choice but to apply these international norms to their internal conflicts as well. The 
Geneva Conventions will be applicable to non-international conflicts as soon as 
humanitarian law has direct effect.  
 
Due to globalization and an increasing interdependence of states decision making has 
shifted from the national to the international level. Therefore, the position a state takes as 
to the relation between international law and its national law becomes of more relevance. 
Considering that this position is a political decision and considering the possibility for 
citizens to influenced it, I find sovereignty should remain fully and indivisible with states. 
Attempts to infringe on the sovereign position of states leads to vagueness, inequalities 
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and violations of human rights. If applicability of the Geneva Conventions to non-
international conflicts is considered a necessity the system of sovereignty of states 
should be used and this issue should be placed on the national and international political 
agenda. The neutrality of the ICRC will not be affected when pleading a cause in line of 
its task: the promoter and custodian of international humanitarian law. 
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